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The	financial	health	of	British	political	parties:	what
the	latest	data	tells	us
New	data	by	the	Electoral	Commission	on	party	funding	shows,	among	other	things,	that	Labour	raised
a	record-breaking	£16m	in	a	year	through	membership	fees	alone,	while	the	Conservatives	received
more	money	from	bequests	than	from	living	members.	Sam	Power	explains	what	these	figures	tell	us
about	the	state	of	play	in	UK	party	politics,	and	how	they	compare	with	previous	years.
In	late	August	2018	the	Electoral	Commission	released	the	annual	accounting	figures	of	all	major
parties	for	2017.	Every	year	this	batch	of	data	tends	to	cause	(brief)	excitement,	with	various	media	narratives	taking
hold	about	what	it	can	tell	us.	This	year	was	no	different.	Did	Labour	really	raise	£10	million	more	than	the	Tories?
Do	these	figures	reinforce	an	existential	crisis	facing	the	Tory	grassroots?	Using	figures	dating	from	2002,	I’ll	unpick
what	they	do,	and	do	not,	tell	us	about	the	state	of	play	in	British	party	politics	today.
How	much	did	each	party	raise?
As	figure	1	shows,	Labour	kept	up	their	streak	from	2010	of	out-raising	the	Conservatives	by,	as	reported,	just	under
£10	million.	This	figure	was	actually	considerably	down	on	2016	where	Labour’s	advantage	stood	at	over	£20	million.
We	should	be	a	little	wary	of	reading	too	much	into	this.	2010	was,	of	course,	the	year	that	the	Conservatives
became	the	party	of	government.	As	such	since	2010,	Labour	have	been	in	receipt	of	considerable	amounts	of	Short
Money	(which	is	money	provided	by	the	state	to	parties	not	in	government).	In	2017	Labour’s	Short	Money	return
was	£7,427,000,	as	opposed	to	the	Conservatives	who	received	just	£562,000	in	grants.
Figure	1	Total	party	income	(Conservatives	and	Labour),	2017
How	much	of	this	was	through	the	membership	–	and	does	it	matter?
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The	most	impressive	feat	of	Corbyn’s	Labour	has	been	the	amount	the	party	has	been	able	to	raise	through
membership	subscriptions.	Figure	2	highlights	the	stark	increase	in	this	form	of	income	from	2015	onwards	–	from
£5,971,000	in	2014	to	£16,165,000	in	2017.	Put	another	way,	in	2017	membership	fees	accounted	for	29%	of	total
party	income.	It	is	often	discussed	that	Jeremy	Corbyn’s	organisational	and	political	strength	comes	from	the	loyal
membership;	these	figures	show	that	they	also	provide	a	significant	amount	of	income	to	the	political	party.	Yet,	they
still	only	provide	29%	of	total	party	income.	Therefore,	whilst	impressive,	these	figures	also	represent	a	stark
reminder	that	even	parties	with	a	historically	high	membership	cannot	rely	solely	on	it	for	their	money.
Figure	2	Labour	Party	income	(membership	fees,	grants,	donations	and	fundraising,	other	income),	2002-2017
The	Labour	membership	numbers	are	all	the	more	impressive	when	compared	with	those	of	the	Conservative	Party
(Figure	3).	Whilst	Labour	raised	over	£16	million	in	2017,	the	Conservatives	only	raised	£835,000	–	this	has	been
about	the	standard	from	2011	onwards.	Indeed,	so	low	is	the	membership	income	that	a	number	of	commentators
noted	that	dead	people	(in	the	form	of	legacies)	had	actually	donated	more	to	the	Conservative	Party	than	their
(barely)	alive	and	kicking	membership.	This,	on	the	face	of	it,	is	both	accurate	and	quite	funny	but	should	be	taken
with	a	rather	large	grain	of	salt	because	the	Conservatives	raise,	spend,	and	report	the	vast	amount	of	their	income
at	constituency	level.	Other	amounts	can	therefore	be	found	in	local	association	which	means	that	the	actual
membership	income	stands	at	about	£4	million.
One	might	suggest	that	the	reasons	journalists	are,	for	example,	required	to	speculate	over	the	number	of
Conservative	Party	members	is	that	the	party	routinely	do	not	include	these	figures	in	their	accounting	returns.
Furthermore,	common	accounting	standards	and	practises	–	a	change	that	has	been	suggested	by	the	Committee
on	Standards	in	Public	Life	–	might	make	returns	a	little	easier	to	understand	in	context.	If	a	number	of	people
struggle	to	comprehend	something,	there’s	a	case	for	making	that	thing	easier	to	understand.
Figure	3	Conservative	Party	income	(membership	fees,	grants,	donations	and	fundraising,	other	income),	2002-2017
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This	misunderstanding	also	speaks	to	a	broader	problem	of	equating	membership	income	with	membership	figures.
They	are	not	one	and	the	same.	For	example,	the	membership	of	the	Labour	Party	fell	from	248,000	in	2002,	to	a
nadir	of	156,000	in	2009,	before	rising	back	to	approximately	193,000	in	2014.	Figure	2,	however,	shows	that
membership	income	continued	on	a	slight	incline	in	this	period.	Political	parties	can,	within	reason,	make	their
membership	income	work	for	them	as	and	when	they	need	it.	Membership	income	being	at	a	low	(or	high)	level	is	not
necessarily	indicative	of	party	weakness	(or	strength).
Donations	are	becoming	less	cyclical,	but	that’s	only	because	British	politics	is
Finally,	one	thing	we	know	about	political	party	funding	is	that	it	is	cyclical	in	nature.	You	tend	to	get	donation	peaks
in	(general)	election	years	and	troughs	in	those	without.	Analytically	speaking,	this	means	we	should	always	be	wary
of	reading	too	much	into	figures	from	a	single	year,	particularly	when	that	year	is	an	election	year.	However,	the
recent	data	seems	to	show	that	this	cyclical	pattern	is	less	defined	than	it	once	was	(see	the	above	figures).	This
may	well	be	because	British	politics	just	isn’t	as	cyclical	as	it	once	was	–	since	2014	we’ve	been	in	almost	constant
election	mode.	If	all	remains	calm,	the	2018	returns	may	well	be	a	useful	guide	to	understanding	whether,	in	political
finance	terms,	the	past	three	years	have	been	a	blip	or	represent	the	new	normal.
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